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Abstract To enhance believability of virtual agents, this pa-
per presents an agent-based modelling approach for deci-
sion making, which integrates rational reasoning based on
means-end analysis with personal psychological and bio-
logical aspects. The agent model developed is a combina-
tion of a BDI-model and a utility-based decision model in
the context of specific desires and beliefs. The approach
is illustrated by addressing the behaviour of violent crimi-
nals, thereby creating a model for virtual criminals. Within
a number of simulation experiments, the model has been
tested in the context of a street robbery scenario. In addi-
tion, a user study has been performed, which confirms the
fact that the model enhances believability of virtual agents.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, human-like virtual agents are increasingly
being applied in various domains [29, 32]. Typical exam-
ples are agents in (serious) games (e.g., an instructor in a
naval training simulator [13], character agents in computer-
generated virtual stories [10], or conversational agents (e.g.,
seller representatives on the internet [25]). Recently, much
research has been dedicated to developing virtual agents
with more realistic graphical representations. However, the
behaviour of such agents is usually not very human-like. For
example, although many virtual agents currently have the
ability to somehow show emotions by means of different
facial expressions, it is quite difficult for them to show the
right emotion at the right moment. This is in conflict with the
requirement of virtual agents to closely mimic human affec-
tive behavior. Several studies in Social Sciences have shown
that this is an important prerequisite for an agent to increase
human involvement in the virtual environment [18]. There-
fore, existing systems based on IVAs are not as effective as
they could be.
A known problem encountered by developers of human-
like virtual agents is to create realistic decision making be-
haviour for such agents. For humans it is known that the
process of decision making is determined partly by ratio-
nal means-end reasoning, and partly by subjective personal
biological and psychological aspects (including, for exam-
ple, their motivational and emotional state, see, e.g., [12, 14,
24, 38]). On the one hand, humans have various kinds of—
partly biologically determined—desires, but on the other
hand, they may have to reason rationally about which desires
to fulfil. For example, a person may have the desire to eat
but may decide rationally not to do this because it will make
him/her fat. However, if the biological desire is too strong,
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the person may decide to eat nevertheless. Thus, some mech-
anism is used that enables humans to make decisions in situ-
ations where both rational and biological/psychological fac-
tors play a role.
This paper introduces an approach to incorporate such
mechanisms within virtual agents in order to make their
behaviour more human-like. In principle, the approach is
generic, i.e., it can be used to model virtual agents in various
types of applications (varying from serious games to virtual
stories) and in various domains (varying from flight simula-
tors to adventure games). As an illustration of the approach,
in the current paper a specific domain is chosen, namely the
domain of crime. This is an interesting case study, since this
is a typical domain in which both rational decision making
and biological and psychological aspects play a role. Within
the area of Criminology, a longstanding debate is whether
criminal behaviour is driven by a criminal’s subjective, per-
sonal biological and psychological background, or is the re-
sult of a rational, calculated choice; e.g., [11, 27]. The cur-
rent paper will show how the two viewpoints can be inte-
grated, thereby creating a behavioural model for a “virtual
criminal agent”.
As a starting point, the criminal agent model described
in [6] has been taken, which focuses specifically on violent
criminals (such as psychopaths and persons with the Inter-
mittent Explosive Disorder), and its embedding in a social
context described in [5]. This model addresses action gen-
eration based on beliefs, desires and intentions (BDI), and
generation of desires and beliefs in opportunities. However,
for the sake of simplicity, only one action per desire was
assumed in that model, so no decision making was cov-
ered involving a choice between different options for ac-
tions to fulfil a desire. The current paper extends that model
with a mechanism for utility-based multi-criteria decision
making (e.g., [21, 33]) within a BDI-setting. This decision
model provides a formalisation of the Rational Choice The-
ory within Criminology; e.g. [11]. This theory as informally
discussed within Criminology describes crime as an event
that occurs, for example, when an offender decides to take
risk breaking the law, after considering his or her own need
for money, personal values or learning experiences and how
well a target is protected. The criminal assesses the chances
of getting caught, the expected penalty, the value to be
gained by committing the act, and his or her immediate need
for that value.
In the decision model introduced in this paper, this
process is modelled by introducing utilities for different pos-
sible intended actions. The utility of a certain (option for an)
action is then assessed according to the extent to which it
fulfils the agent’s desire. In this way utilities are assessed
with respect to a subjective measure focusing on a specific
desire, which may be affected by the subject’s specific bi-
ological and psychological background. In other words, for
the individual agent, rational choice means the choice to ful-
fil its own desires in the best possible way. Thus, the model
for desire generation based on the biological and psycholog-
ical factors is integrated with a rational decision model for
the choice of (intended) actions.
In this paper, Sect. 2 discusses the dynamic modelling ap-
proach that was used at a global level. In Sect. 3, a brief sum-
mary from the literature is presented on the role played by
biological and psychological factors in criminal behaviour.
Next, the two main components of the simulation model are
presented: Sect. 4 briefly presents the model to determine
desires (inspired by [6]) and Sect. 5 presents the utility-
based decision making model. In Sect. 6, some simulation
results are shown, addressing an example street robbery sce-
nario. Section 7 describes the results of an experiment to
evaluate how the generated simulation traces are appreci-
ated by humans. Finally, the approach and its possible ap-
plications are discussed in Sect. 8.
2 Modelling approach
Modelling the various aspects related to criminal decision
making of virtual agents in an integrated manner poses some
challenges. On the one hand, qualitative aspects have to be
addressed, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, certain
brain deviations, and some aspects of the environment such
as the presence of certain agents. On the other hand, quanti-
tative aspects have to be addressed, such as testosterone and
serotonin levels, and utilities. Moreover, the aspects have to
be integrated in such a way that the resulting model can eas-
ily be implemented within a virtual agent. For example, it
should be possible to connect them to concrete events and
states that occur in a virtual world, such as encounters be-
tween agents, and goals of individual agents.
It was not easy to find a modelling approach that ful-
filled all of the above desiderata. Within the cognitive mod-
elling area, a number of generic architectures exist for com-
putational modelling of cognitive processes such as atten-
tion, memory, and decision making, for example ACT-R
[1], Soar [23], and Clarion [40]. These approaches have as
advantages that they distinguish in some way or another—
between implicit (or subconscious) and explicit (conscious,
rational) processes. For this reason, the approach put for-
ward in this article was inspired by these approaches. How-
ever, they could not be used directly, for two reasons. First,
these approaches were originally designed for the purpose of
representing cognitive processes in much detail (including,
for instance, specific timing parameters in terms of millisec-
onds), and were therefore not directly applicable to virtual
agents, which need modelling constructs at a much higher
level of abstraction. Second, they do not provide any mech-
anism to model biological factors, such as testosterone and
serotonin levels.
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To solve the first problem, it was decided to also take
some inspiration from the area of Artificial Intelligence
(and, more specifically, agent-based modelling). In this area,
it is quite common to model an agent’s behaviour in terms of
beliefs, desires, and intentions [17, 31, 35, 36]. Thus, it was
decided to take the standard BDI-model [17, 36] as a basis,
and extend this with a mechanism to represent implicit, sub-
conscious processes as done in cognitive modelling architec-
tures. However, since the second problem (the lack of con-
structs for biological factors) could not be solved directly by
the BDI-model, the authors decided to develop a new model,
thereby integrating the BDI-model with constructs for both
psychological (cognitive) as well as biological factors.
To develop this new integrated model, the modelling lan-
guage LEADSTO [7] turned out to be a suitable candi-
date. This language integrates qualitative, logical aspects
and quantitative, numerical aspects. This integration allows
the modeller to exploit both logical and numerical meth-
ods for analysis and simulation. The basic building blocks
of LEADSTO are so-called executable dynamic properties,
by which direct temporal dependencies between two state
properties in successive states are modelled. Their format is
defined as follows. Let α and β be state properties of the
form ‘conjunction of ground atoms or negations of ground
atoms’. In LEADSTO, the notation α e,f,g,h β , means:
If state property α holds for a certain time interval with duration g,
then after some delay (between e and f ) state property β will hold
for a certain time interval of length h.
Here, atomic state properties can have a qualitative, log-
ical format, such as an expression desire(d), expressing that
desire d occurs, or a quantitative, numerical format such
as an expression has_value(x, v) which expresses that vari-
able x has value v. For more details of the language LEAD-
STO, see [7]. As stated above, the overall simulation model
has been built by composing two models (see Fig. 1 for an
overview):
Fig. 1 Overview of criminal decision making model
1. a model to determine desires incorporating various bio-
logical and psychological aspects and their interactions
(subconscious model)
2. a model for reasoning about beliefs, desires and inten-
tions, using a BDI-model based on utility-based decision
making (conscious, rational model).
These models have both been implemented in LEADSTO.
They are described in more detail in Sects. 4 and 5, respec-
tively.
To create the subconscious model, we first performed an
extensive research in the existing literature on criminal be-
haviour, in collaboration with a group of experts from dif-
ferent disciplines. These experts, among which psycholo-
gists, criminologists and experts in AI, together agreed upon
a short list of factors that were selected to be used in the
model. The biological factors that were selected are based
on work by Moir and Jessel [27] and by Adrian Raine [34],
a well known neurocriminologist. Some of the psycholog-
ical factors are inspired by work by psychologist Martine
Delfos [13]. A complete overview of the factors that were
selected for the model is provided in the next section.
3 Biological and psychological factors
Since the BDI model [17, 36] does not prescribe a standard
way to determine how desires are created, for a particular
application usually domain-specific knowledge is used. For
criminal behaviour, a number of specific biological and psy-
chological aspects seem to play a role in the generation of
desires. An extensive search has been performed into litera-
ture from areas such as Criminology and Psychology (e.g.,
[13, 27, 34]) for aspects to be incorporated in the model. The
aspects that have been selected are explained below in more
detail.
A theory of mind of a person (e.g., [2]) describes other
persons’ minds by separate mental concepts, such as the
person’s own beliefs, desires, and intentions, and how those
concepts play a role in the person’s behaviour. Criminal ac-
tions are often performed by persons whose theory of mind
is less developed. In recent years, more evidence is found
that there often are biological reasons for this. For example,
it has been found that many psychopaths have a damaged
connection between the frontal lobes (concerned with con-
science and remorse) and the limbic area, which generates
feelings; cf. [27].
Another important aspect in crimes is aggressiveness.
Research has pointed out that there is a correlation between
aggressive behaviour and the level of testosterone. In fact,
89% to 95% of all crime is performed by males [27]. In ad-
dition, the use of alcohol or drugs may increase the violence
of behaviour.
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A third aspect involved in criminal behaviour is the desire
to act, which can be related to a high level of adrenalin. If
a person’s adrenalin level becomes too high, (s)he somehow
has to cope with this; acting decreases the adrenalin level.
Thus, if the desire to act is high, then a criminal act more
easily occurs. The specific types of actions that are chosen
depend on another factor, the desire to act safely. This factor
correlates with a high level of oxytocine, a hormone mainly
produced by women. Persons with a high level of oxytocine
have a higher tendency to cope with their desire to act by
performing ‘safe’ actions (e.g., taking care of the ‘nest’) than
persons with less oxytocine; they will rather perform ‘less
safe’ actions (e.g., fighting) [13].
In addition, crimes are often committed by persons who
are looking for a thrill. These persons in general have a high
excitement threshold, which means that it is very difficult
for them to become excited [27, 34]. As a result, they are
often bored, so that they generate a desire for actions with
strong stimuli. Such actions may become criminal actions,
such as stealing, joyriding, or assaulting other people. Only
by performing these actions, their desire for strong stimuli
is fulfilled, and they become less bored.
Furthermore, a significant amount of committed crimes
can be described as impulsive. They are not planned, but
rather triggered by occasional opportunities. An important
factor causing impulsive behaviour is a low level of blood
sugar, which in turn is caused by a high insulin level and a
low serotonin level [27].
A next factor that may affect the types of (criminal) ac-
tions that persons may perform, is the extent to which they
have (positive or negative) feelings with respect to another
person’s wellbeing. When someone has a low amount of
positive feelings towards others, (s)he does not really care
about the other. Likewise, when someone has many nega-
tive feelings towards others, (s)he may wants to cause harm
towards someone else. For example, in psychopaths, both
attitudes are low: these persons hardly show any emotion
concerning other persons, so for them, both the positive and
the negative emotional attitude towards others are low [27].
The last two factors chosen to incorporate in the model
are the desire for high gain and the desire for low loss.
These concepts were chosen on the basis of the Rational
Choice Theory [11]. According to this theory, to determine
their actions, persons will try to minimise their expected loss
or penalty (e.g., being caught, getting hurt) and maximise
their gain (e.g., money, status). The theory states that crimi-
nals will make a serious decision before committing a crime,
weighing pros against cons.
4 Determining desires
To determine desires, a rather complex submodel is used,
incorporating dynamical system elements for the biologi-
cal and psychological aspects as mentioned earlier, varying
from qualitative aspects, such as anatomical aspects con-
cerning brain deviations (e.g., the absence of certain connec-
tions) to quantitative aspects, such as biochemical aspects
concerning testosterone levels. Some example LEADSTO
specifications (called Local Properties, LPs) are given be-
low (both in informal and in formal notation):1
LP9 A certain level of current testosterone will lead to a corresponding
level of aggressiveness.
∀x:SCALE chemical_state(testosterone,current,x)
0,0,1,1 desire_for_aggressiveness(x)
LP20 Observation of a stimulus with an excitement level that is lower
than the excitement threshold will lead to boredom.
∀s1,s2,y:INTEGER observes_stimulus(s1,s2) ∧
excitement_threshold(y) ∧ s2<y 0,0,1,1 boredom
LP21 Boredom leads to a high desire for actions with strong stimuli.
boredom 0,0,1,1 desire_for_actions_with_strong_stimuli(high)
LP29a A low blood sugar level leads to high impulsiveness.
chemical_state(blood_sugar, low)
0,0,1,1 desire_for_impulsiveness(high)
The variety of biological and psychological aspects that
were found relevant in the literature (such as [3, 13, 27,
34]) and are taken into account in this model, are those de-
scribed in the second section above. Different combinations
of these elements lead to different types of (composed) de-
sires; e.g., the desire to perform an exciting planned nonag-
gressive nonrisky action that harms somebody else (e.g., a
pick pocket action in a large crowd). The following LEAD-
STO rule generates a composed desire out of the different
ingredients mentioned earlier:
LP30 A combination of values for theory of mind, desire for
aggressiveness, desire to act, desire to act safely, desire for actions with
strong stimuli, desire for impulsiveness, positive and negative emotional
attitude towards others, and desire for high gain and low loss leads to a
specific composed desire, represented as
d(has_value(theory_of_mind, s1), . . . ,
has_value(desire_for_low_loss, s10)).
∀s1,s2,s3,s4,s5,s6,s7,s8,s9,s10:SCALE
theory_of_mind(s1) ∧ desire_for_aggressiveness(s2) ∧
desire_to_act(s3) ∧ desire_to_act_safely(s4) ∧
desire_for_actions_with_strong_stimuli(s5) ∧
desire_for_impulsiveness(s6) ∧
emotional_attitude_towards_others(pos,s7) ∧
emotional_attitude_towards_others(neg,s8) ∧
desire_for_high_gain(s9) ∧ desire_for_low_loss(s10) 0,0,1,1
desire(d(has_value(theory_of_mind, s1), . . . ,
has_value(desire_for_low_loss, s10)))
1See [6] for the complete criminal agent model, and [5] for its embed-
ding in a social context.
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5 Utility-based reasoning about intentions
As in [6], part of the model for criminal behaviour is based
on the BDI-model, which bases the preparation and per-
forming of actions on beliefs, desires and intentions (e.g.,
[17, 36]). In this model an action is performed when the sub-
ject has the intention to do this action and it has the belief
that the opportunity to do the action is there. Beliefs are cre-
ated on the basis of stimuli that are observed. The intention
to do a specific type of action is created if there is a certain
desire, and there is the belief that in the given world state,
performing this action will fulfill this desire. The BDI-model
was specified by:
LP31 Desire d combined with the belief that a certain action a will lead to
the fulfillment of that desire will lead to the intention to perform that
action.
∀d:DESIRE ∀a:ACTION desire(d) ∧ belief(satisfies(a, d)) 0,0,1,1
intention(a)
LP32 The belief that there is an opportunity to perform a certain action
combined with the intention to perform that action will lead to the
performance of that action.
∀a:ACTION belief(opportunity_for(a)) ∧ intention(a)
0,0,1,1 performed(a)
However, to assess and compare different options, and
select a best option, as an extension to this basic BDI-model
utilities are to be assigned and combined, addressing the de-
gree to which an action satisfies a desire. The notion of util-
ity to be used requires some reflection. Sometimes this may
be considered a rational notion with an absolute, intersub-
jective (or objective) status. For two agents with a kind of
standard internal functioning, considered rational, this in-
tersubjectivity may be a reasonable assumption. However,
if the internal processes are different it is less reasonable.
One agent may have preferences different from those of the
other agent, and hence be satisfied with a situation that is
not satisfactory for the other agent. As an example, multi-
attribute negotiation aims at exploiting such differences in
preferences between agents in order to the benefit of both;
e.g., [7, 20, 21, 33]. This shows that the meaning of utility
can be subjective and personal. In particular, for a criminal
subject, due to his or her specific biological and psycholog-
ical characteristics, a desire can be quite deviant from what
is commonly considered as the rational norm. For this sub-
ject the utility of a certain action a is assessed according
to the extent to which it fulfils this personal desire. This
shows how utilities are assessed with respect to a subjec-
tive measure focusing on a specific desire d, which is af-
fected, or even largely determined by the subject’s specific
biological and psychological background. According to this
perspective, the utility-based decision model was set up as
follows:
1. Aspect utility value representations
For any aspect xi with value si, introduce an aspect utility
vi for any possible action a by
has_aspect_utility(a, has_value(x1, s1), v1)
. . .
has_aspect_utility(a, has_value(xk, sk), vk)
where vi is based on a closeness measure for each aspect xi
of the considered option a to value si, normalised between
0 (least close, minimal utility) and 1 (most close, maximal
utility). For example,
has_aspect_utility(fight,
has_value(desire_for_aggressiveness, high), 0.9)
indicates that the action of fighting contributes much to a
high value for aggressiveness.
2. Aspect weight factor representations
Introduce weight factors w1, . . . , wk for the different as-
pects xi, normalised so that the sum is 1, and introduce re-
lations weight_factor(xi, wi) stating that aspect xi has weight
factor wi.
3. Combination of aspect utilities to option utilities
Combine the option aspect utility values v1, . . . , vk for a
given composed desire to an overall option utility taking into
account the weight factors w1, . . . , wk, according to some
combination function f(v1, . . . , vk, w1, . . . , wk).
The combination function in 3. can be formalised in a
number of manners; two common possibilities are:
• Euclidian Distance: f(v1, . . . , vk, w1, . . . , wk) = √(w1v12 +
· · · + wkvk2)
• Manhattan Distance: f(v1, . . . , vk, w1, . . . , wk) = w1v1 + · · ·
+ wkvk
The LEADSTO property for combination is:
LP41 ∀a:ACTION ∀x1,. . . ,xk:ASPECT ∀s1,. . . ,sk:SCALE ∀
v1,. . . ,vk,w1,. . . ,wk:REAL
belief(has_aspect_utility(a, has_value(x1, s1),v1)) ∧· · ·∧
belief(has_aspect_utility(a, has_value(xk, sk), vk)) ∧
weight_factor(x1, w1) ∧· · ·∧ weight_factor(xk, wk) 0,0,1,1
belief(has_utility(a, d(has_value(x1, s1), . . . , has_value(xk, sk)),
f(v1, . . . , vk, w1, . . . , wk) ))
Note that the model currently assumes that a value is filled
in for each aspect utility and each weight factor. However, in
order to deal with missing values, it can easily be extended
by defining a default value (for example, 0.5 for the aspect
utilities, and 0 for the weight factors) for each of the missing
factors.
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Fig. 2 Utility-based BDI-model
Next, the choice process is formalised. This is done in
two steps. First, LP31 is replaced by LP31a, LP31b, and
LP31c:
LP31a Desire d combined with the belief that a certain action a will
lead to the fulfillment of d with utility u (≥c) will lead to the
consideration of a as a possible intention option.
∀d:DESIRE ∀a:ACTION ∀u:REAL desire(d) ∧
belief(has_utility(a, d, u) ∧ u≥c) 0.2,0.2,1,1 is_intention_option(a, u)
Here c is a threshold value, for example 0.5. This is used
to generate the options to be considered. To obtain only the
intentions with highest utility, as a next phase, the selection
process is modelled in two steps by:
LP31b If a1 and a2 are both intention options, but a2 has a higher
utility, then a1 is ruled out as an intention option.
∀a1,a2:ACTION ∀u1,u2:REAL is_intention_option(a1,u1) ∧
is_intention_option(a2,u2) ∧ u1<u2 0,0,1,1
ruled_out_intention_option(a1, u1)
LP31c Eventually, an intention option that is not ruled out is selected
as final intention.
∀a:ACTION ∀u:REAL is_intention_option(a, u) ∧
not ruled_out_intention_option(a, u) 0,0,1,1 intention(a)
The complete utility-based decision model is depicted
graphically in Fig. 2. The circles denote state properties, and
the arrows denote dynamic (LEADSTO) properties. Notice
that the state properties of the type desire(. . . ) are generated
by the model described in the previous section.
Note that, in order to describe a specific decision making
scenario with this model, the agent described needs to have
some expectancy about possible actions already at the start
of the scenario. This expectancy may be triggered by obser-
vations (e.g., “I see a potential victim and no guardians, so
I consider robbing this person”), or by other internal states
(e.g., “I feel like seeking some thrill, so I consider robbing
a bank this afternoon”). In the first case, the duration be-
tween the decision and the actual performance of the action
is rather short, so that it is very likely that an opportunity for
the considered action will indeed occur. In the second case,
this duration will be longer, and it is possible that no oppor-
tunity will occur at all. The model can be used to simulate
both types of processes.
6 Example simulation traces
Based on the model shown above, a number of simulation
experiments have been performed to test (for some sim-
ple scenarios) whether it shows the expected behaviour. In
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Table 1 Characteristics of criminal1 and possible assaultsa
weight factor aspect utility aspect utility
(criminal1) (assault1) (assault2)
theory of mind 0.04 low, 0.7 low, 0.9
desire for aggressiveness 0.04 high, 0.3 high, 0.8
desire to act 0.17 high, 0.8 high, 0.8
desire to act safely 0.02 high, 0.7 high, 0.1
desire for actions with strong stimuli 0.17 high, 0.6 high, 0.8
desire for impulsiveness 0.12 medium, 0.5 medium, 0.5
positive emotional attitude towards others 0.02 low, 0.7 low, 0.8
negative emotional attitude towards others 0.04 low, 0.3 low, 0.3
desire for high gain 0.19 high, 0.5 high, 0.8
desire for low loss 0.19 high, 0.8 high, 0.5
aThis approach assumes that an individual’s preferences (i.e., the weight factors), as well as the characteristics of certain actions (i.e., aspect
utilities), can be expressed by real numbers. For the presented examples, the chosen numbers are not necessarily claimed to be realistic, and should
rather be seen as estimations that were chosen to create interesting scenarios that roughly correspond to reality. All parameter settings were chosen
after discussions with domain experts (that were taken from the expert group mentioned in Sect. 2)
this section, two example simulation traces are described in
detail. Both traces address the same scenario, but the per-
sonal characteristics of the main character differ between
the two traces. The first example trace involves a virtual
street robber agent (indicated by criminal1) who observes
some possible targets, and is deliberating about whether or
not to perform an assault (and if so, which assault to per-
form). For simplicity, we assume that there are two possi-
ble assaults to choose from (indicated by assault1 and as-
sault2, respectively). In case of assault1, the agent would
steal an old lady’s grocery bag, without using extreme vi-
olence. In case of assault2, it would steal a young man’s
brand new laptop. However, since this man seems to be
rather strong, it would probably have to use violence to
achieve its goal. The characteristics of both assaults, as
well as criminal1’s individual preferences, are shown in Ta-
ble 1.
In the second column of the table, the different weight
factors assigned to criminal1 can be seen. These weight fac-
tors, which add up to 1, show the relative importance of
each aspect for the agent. The weight factor for desire to act
safely, for example, is 0.02. This means that criminal1 has a
low interest in the desire to act safely. The weight factor for
desire for actions with strong stimuli is 0.17, which means
that he has a high desire for actions with strong stimuli.
In the columns to the right of the weight factor, the utility
of the different aspects is mentioned (in the third column
for assault1 and in the column to the right for assault2).
The values describe in how far the aspect is present in this
particular assault. For example, has_aspect_utility(assault1,
has_value(desire_for_aggressiveness, high), 0.3) shows that
assault1 does not contribute much to the high desire for ag-
gressiveness. On the other hand, has_aspect_utility(assault2,
has_value(desire_for_aggressiveness, high), 0.8) shows that
assault2 contributes much to the high desire for aggressive-
ness.
The results of applying the simulation model to this ex-
ample situation are shown in Fig. 3. Here, time points are on
the horizontal axis, whereas the different state properties are
on the vertical axis. A box on top of a line indicates that a
state property is true at that time point. As shown by this fig-
ure, the agent immediately has a certain desire, represented
as d1. Note that this stands for a complex desire represented
as:
d(has_value(theory_of_min,low),
has_value(desire_for_aggressiveness,high),
has_value(desire_to_act,high), has_value(desire_to_act_safely,high),
has_value(desire_for_actions_with_strong_stimuli,high),
has_value(desire_for_impulsiveness,medium),
has_value(positive_emotional_attitude_towards_others,low),
has_value(negative_emotional_attitude_towards_others,low),
has_value(desire_for_high_gain,high),
has_value(desire_for_low_loss,high))
(which was not shown in the picture, for obvious reasons).
This desire was generated by a complex process, involving
a combination of biological and psychological factors. For
presentation purposes, this part of the trace is not shown here
either. However, more detailed simulation traces that include
such processes are shown in Appendix A in [5].
Based on the desire as described above, agent criminal1
then starts assessing the utilities of the two possible assaults
(see the predicates belief(has_utility(. . . )) at time point 1),
based on the aspect utilities and weight factors of these as-
saults. The action of stealing the young man’s laptop (as-
sault2) is assessed with value 0.678723, whereas the ac-
tion of robbing the old lady’s groceries (assault1) has value
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Fig. 3 Example simulation
trace for criminal 1
Table 2 Characteristics of criminal 2 and possible assaults
weight factor aspect utility aspect utility
(criminal2) (assault1) (assault2)
theory of mind 0.04 low, 0.7 low, 0.9
desire for aggressiveness 0.04 high, 0.3 high, 0.8
desire to act 0.17 high, 0.8 high, 0.8
desire to act safely 0.04 high, 0.7 high, 0.1
desire for actions with strong stimuli 0.15 high, 0.6 high, 0.8
desire for impulsiveness 0.12 medium, 0.5 medium, 0.5
positive emotional attitude towards others 0.02 low, 0.7 low, 0.8
negative emotional attitude towards others 0.04 low, 0.3 low, 0.3
desire for high gain 0.11 high, 0.5 high, 0.8
desire for low loss 0.28 high, 0.8 high, 0.5
0.625532. Since both has_utility-values are higher than 0.5,
both actions become possible intentions (see time point 2).
Next, the agent chooses the one with the highest utility,
which leads to the intention to perform assault2 at time
point 3. Later, when an opportunity for assault2 arises (time
point 20), this assault is indeed performed (time point 21).
In a second example trace another street robber agent
(criminal 2) observes the same possible targets as crimi-
nal 1, and is also deliberating about whether or not to per-
form an assault (and if so, which assault to perform). Also in
this case, we assume that there are two possible assaults to
choose from: assault1 (stealing an old lady’s grocery bag
without using extreme violence) and assault2 (stealing a
young man’s brand new laptop potentially with the use of vi-
olence). The characteristics of both assaults are the same as
in the previous case study. However, the preferences of the
two criminals are somewhat different. The individual pref-
erences of criminal2 are shown in Table 2.
In the first column of the table, the different weight fac-
tors assigned to criminal2 can be seen. These weight factors,
which add up to 1, show the relative importance of each as-
pect for the agent. Compared to criminal1, criminal2 has a
different weight factor assigned to the desires to act safely,
for actions with strong stimuli, for high gain and for low
loss. The weight factor for desire for high gain, for exam-
ple, is 0.11. This means that criminal2 has a high interest
in the desire for high gain. However, the weight factor for
desire for low loss 0.28, which means that the agent has a
very high desire for low loss. For this criminal, low loss is
much more important than high gain. In the columns to the
right of the weight factor, the utility of the different aspects
is mentioned.
The results of applying the simulation model to this ex-
ample situation are shown in Fig. 4. As shown by this fig-
ure, the agent immediately has a certain desire, represented
as d2, which stands for a more complex desire represented
as:
d(has_value(theory_of_min,low),
has_value(desire_for_aggressiveness,high),
has_value(desire_to_act,high), has_value(desire_to_act_safely,high),
has_value(desire_for_actions_with_strong_stimuli,high),
has_value(desire_for_impulsiveness,medium),
has_value(positive_emotional_attitude_towards_others,low),
has_value(negative_emotional_attitude_towards_others,low),
has_value(desire_for_high_gain,high),
has_value(desire_for_low_loss,high))
as can also be seen in the last two columns of Table 2.
Based on the desire as described above, criminal2 then starts
assessing the utilities of the two possible assaults (see the
predicates belief(has_utility(. . . )) at time point 1), based on
the aspect utilities and weight factors of these assaults. The
action of stealing the old lady’s groceries (assault1) is as-
sessed with value 0.652475, whereas the action of robbing
the young man’s laptop (assault2) has value 0.637624. Since
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Fig. 4 Example simulation
trace for criminal 2
both has_utility-values are higher than 0.5, both actions be-
come possible intentions (see time point 2). Next, the agent
chooses the one with the highest utility, which leads to the
intention to perform assault1 at time point 3. Later, when an
opportunity for assault1 arises (time point 30), this assault
is indeed performed (time point 31).
As illustrated by the traces in Figs. 3 and 4, the simu-
lation experiments have indicated that the presented model
successfully integrates personal biological and psychologi-
cal aspects within the decision making process, which even-
tually leads to the selection of actions that correspond to the
desires of the individual. Although the presented scenario
was kept simple, these experiments illustrate how the model
allows agents with different personal characteristics to make
different decisions in the same situation (criminal1 decided
to rob the old lady, whereas criminal2 decided to steal the
young man’s laptop).
In addition to the simulations described above, the model
has been used to generate various other simulation traces
under different parameter settings. Such simulation exper-
iments enabled the modellers to investigate (at an abstract
level) whether the developed model shows satisfactory be-
haviour (cf. prototyping in Software Engineering). The obvi-
ous next step is to implement the model within concrete real-
world applications. Due to the intuitive (causal relationship-
based) format of the LEADSTO language, and the fact that
it is independent of a particular implementation language,
this step is relatively straightforward. For earlier work where
agents models written in LEADSTO have been converted to
virtual environment applications, see [8, 9].
7 User study
To evaluate how humans perceive the developed agent (with
our criminal decision making model) we performed an ex-
periment. We used the scenario introduced earlier, about a
street robber who has the choice between different assaults.
To be able to assess the impact of the different parts of the
criminal decision making model, we applied some variations
of the model to the scenario.
A. The criminal decision making model with the personal-
ity traits of criminal 1.
B. The criminal decision making model with the personal-
ity traits of criminal 2.
C. Standard BDI model without any personality traits.
D. The criminal decision making model with the person-
ality traits of criminal 1, where we deliberately imple-
mented the decision making component incorrect. This
means that the model suggests those actions that are least
satisfactory to the agent’s desire as best possibilities.
E. The criminal decision making model with the person-
ality traits of criminal 2, where we deliberately imple-
mented the action generation component incorrect. This
means that the model selects actions that do not match
the agent’s intentions.
Variant D and E have been added to check whether virtual
agent believability is already enhance by a criminal decision
making model per se, or whether a realistic model is needed.
After generating simulation traces on the basis of these 5
models, for each of the atomic state properties that occur in
the model, a mapping has been create to a text fragment. For
example, the state property
is_intention_option(X,Y) (where Y is high)
corresponds to the text fragment
The agent considers X a good option.
Similarly, the state property
belief(opportunity_for(X))
corresponds to
The agent believes that there is an opportunity for X.
Using these mappings and a specific conversion program
that has been written (see [4]), the LEADSTO simulation
traces are automatically translated into virtual storylines in
textual format. An example of such a generated storyline is
shown in Fig. 5.
Twenty persons participated in the experiment. The age
of the participants ranged from 23 to 58 with a mean age of
32 and a standard deviation of 9. Among the participants 13
were male and 7 were female. Each participant was asked
to read the five different stories (there were different ver-
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Fig. 5 Example of a generated
storyline
Fig. 6 Statistical results of the
experiment
Table 3 Detailed statistical results
Statement A-B A-C A-D A-E B-C B-D B-E C-D C-E D-E Overall
Behaves n.s. n.s. 0.023 0.002 n.s. 0.024 0.002 n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.003
Liked n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Realistic n.s. 0.013 0.02 0.000 0.005 0.008 0.000 n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.000
Nice n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.009 0.009 0.014 n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.008
sions of the experiment, each with a different order of the
stories to avoid ordering problems). After reading each sce-
nario the participant filled out a questionnaire. This ques-
tionnaire consisted of 12 statements (see the Appendix). The
participants were asked to award a measurement of agree-
ment on these 12 statements, about how they perceived the
agent. A gradual seven-point scale was used, with the fol-
lowing meaning: 1 = ‘I strongly disagree’, 2 = ‘I disagree’,
3 = ‘I weakly disagree’, 4 = ‘neutral’, 5 = ‘I weakly agree’,
6 = ‘I agree’, 7 = ‘I strongly agree’.
7.1 Results
To analyse the results of the experiment, an ANOVA has
been applied on the answers to the statements of the ques-
tionnaire. In this section, the most relevant statements are
addressed. These statements are: ‘The agent behaves like a
real person’, ‘I liked reading this story’, ‘This is a realistic
story’, and ‘The agent seems to be a nice guy’.
Recall that there were five variants of the scenario: vari-
ant A-E introduced earlier. The results are presented in Ta-
ble 3 and Fig. 6. The vertical axis in Fig. 6 corresponds to
the scale explained above. The first column of the table in-
dicates the statement, and the other columns indicate pair
wise comparisons between the different variants. The “total”
column shows whether the comparison yielded a significant
result or not. The cells indicate the p-value of the ANOVA
(in case the difference was significant), or ‘n.s.’ (in case the
difference was not significant). For example, the third cell of
the first row states ‘0.023’, which means that, according to
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the participants, variant A behaved significantly more like a
real person than variant D.
These results show that there is no significant difference
between how much the different agents are liked by the par-
ticipants (second row). There is a significant difference be-
tween agent A and B on the one hand and agent D and E
on the other hand when it comes to their behaviour (first
row). Agents A and B are the agents that behave accord-
ing to the criminal decision making model. Agents D and E
on the other hand, used an incorrect version of the decision
making model. The participants clearly feel that agents A
and B behave like real persons and agents D and E do not.
There is also a significant difference between A and B on the
one hand and C, D and E on the other hand when it comes
to how realistic the stories are (third row). The participants
agree that A and B are more realistic stories than C, D and
E. Further, there is a significant difference between how nice
the participants find agent B compared to agent C, D and E.
This is an interesting finding. In story B the agent steals a
bag of groceries without any violence, but in addition there
is some background knowledge on his personal characteris-
tics which he uses in his decision making. In story D, the
agent also steals the bag of groceries, but has different per-
sonal characteristics, which do not match his behaviour. Sur-
prisingly, this yielded the participants to perceive this agent
as less friendly.
8 Discussion
In this paper, a model for decision making in virtual agents is
presented, which combines a BDI-agent model with a model
for multi-attribute decision making. It enables a choice be-
tween different options for actions fulfilling a complex de-
sire, according to the Rational Choice Theory in Criminol-
ogy. The resulting agent model combines qualitative, logical
aspects of a BDI-model with quantitative, numerical aspects
of utility theory. The model is illustrated by applying it to
criminal decision making (and more specifically, focussing
on certain types of violent criminals). To this end, [6] crim-
inal agent model was used for desire generation. To study
the behaviour of the model, it has been applied to a case of
street robbery, for which various scenarios have been simu-
lated. In addition, a user study has been performed, in which
the generated simulation traces were converted into virtual
storylines, which were read by 20 participants. The study
confirmed our hypothesis that the model enhances believ-
ability of virtual agents. The participants appreciated those
stories that were generated on the basis of the decision mak-
ing better than baseline stories that were generated on the
basis of a traditional BDI model, or an ‘incongruous’ vari-
ant of the decision making model.
Despite these results, a complete external validation of
the model remains a nontrivial issue. At least, the present
paper has indicated that it is possible to integrate biolog-
ical and psychological factors with rational factors within
one model. Moreover, the model indeed shows the behav-
iour of different types of criminals as described in literature
such as [13, 27, 34], and the user study has confirmed that
this leads to a higher believability. In this sense the model
has been validated positively. However, notice that this is
a relative validation, only with respect to the literature on
criminal decision making, and the expectations by humans.
In cases that the available knowledge about the behaviour
and biological and psychological functioning of such crim-
inal types is extended, the model can be validated accord-
ingly and when needed improved. The modelling approach
as put forward supports such an incremental development
and improvement. The simulation model has been specified
in a conceptual, not implementation-dependent manner, and
is easy to maintain. In this sense the approach anticipates
further development of the area of criminal behaviour.
Concerning related work, in the literature in cognitive
science, more and more authors propose dual process theo-
ries, which claim that cognition can be divided into two dis-
tinct systems: a low-level, emotional and unconscious sys-
tem, and a high-level, evolutionary recent, conscious sys-
tem, see, e.g., [14, 40, 41]. As a result, most contemporary
cognitive modelling architectures (e.g., ACT-R [1], Soar
[23], and, more recently, Clarion [40, 41]) have evolved un-
der the influence of these theories. For example, although
ACT-R is traditionally classified as a ‘symbolic’ architecture
(mainly aimed at representing logical, qualitative aspects), it
has more recently been extended with ‘subsymbolic’ mech-
anisms to represent quantitative, numerical aspects as well.
Currently, the subsymbolic part of ACT-R is represented by
a large set of parallel processes that can be summarised by
a number of mathematical equations, whereas its symbolic
part is fulfilled by a production system. Here, the subsym-
bolic equations control many of the symbolic processes. For
instance, if multiple production rules in ACT-R’s symbolic
part are candidates to be executed, a subsymbolic utility
equation may estimate the relative cost and benefit associ-
ated with each rule and select the rule with the highest util-
ity for execution. A similar development holds for Soar, al-
though the distinction between symbolic and subsymbolic
is a bit less evident here. Clarion, instead, has always been
classified as a ‘hybrid’ cognitive architecture.
Also various cognitive theories about decision making it-
self are inspired by the idea to distinguish two different types
of processes. For example, the recognition-primed decision
(RPD) theory (see [22]) for the theory, and [42] for a com-
putational model) describes decision making as a process
that consists of an ‘intuitive’ part in which the current situ-
ation is matched against patterns learned from experiences
and a ‘conscious, deliberate’ part in which the consequences
of actions are evaluated. Recently, the RPD theory has been
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applied in the area of multi-agent systems as well, see e.g.
[15, 16, 28], although these applications have not addressed
virtual storytelling as yet.
At first sight, our proposed model seems to show signifi-
cant similarities with such theories: our model to determine
desires has characteristics of an unconscious, low-level sys-
tem, whereas the model for utility-based decision making re-
sembles a conscious, high-level system. Future work will ex-
plore whether a more precise mapping can be made between
the concepts introduced in our combined model and the con-
cepts typically used in dual process theory. One of the differ-
ences with existing ‘dual process’ approaches, seems to be
the fact that our model takes biological factors into account.
Another difference is that the cognitive architectures men-
tioned above are more generic, whether the model as pre-
sented in this paper is specialised towards modelling crim-
inal behaviour. Finally, the original research goals underly-
ing both methodologies are somewhat different. Cognitive
architectures have (at least traditionally) as main purpose to
study cognitive processes, whether the model proposed here
aims at developing believable agents.
Also when comparing our model with numerical ap-
proaches to model decision making, such as neural or con-
nectionist networks [37], a difference in perspective can be
observed. The main aim of the latter class of methods is to
build intelligent behaviour (e.g., to solve certain optimisa-
tion problems), whereas our approach was designed to en-
hance realism (and not necessarily intelligence). This dif-
ference also (partly) explains why the approach taken in
this article was to use build an explicit model using exist-
ing knowledge from the literature, instead of taking a ‘black
box’ approach, where it is difficult to understand the actual
behaviour of the model. On the other hand, we acknowl-
edge that the presented model does not incorporate a mech-
anism to improve itself in an automated manner, as is done in
machine learning. Nevertheless, the model can be improved
manually in an iterative manner, which is mainly done by
1) changing the settings of the parameters involved, or by
2) adding or removing factors to the subconscious model.
Input for the first type of adaptation can be derived from user
studies such as described in Sect. 7, whereas the second type
of adaptation can be performed based on new insights in the
expert literature on criminal decision making (as described
earlier).
In addition, it is interesting to explore how our model re-
lates to theories in which affective factors just ‘bypass’ deci-
sion making, such as in [12, 24]. In recent years, such theo-
ries have formed a source of inspiration for the development
of a number of agent-based models for reasoning and (af-
fective) decision making (which often also combine rational
and non-rational aspects) within Artificial Intelligence, such
as in [19, 26, 30, 39]. A difference with the presented model
is that most of these models explicitly focus on the integra-
tion of emotions with rational behaviour, whereas our model
tries to integrate rational behaviour with personal biological
and psychological factors in general (including emotions,
but also notions like aggressiveness and impulsiveness). Fi-
nally, another interesting direction for future work will be to
investigate whether the presented model can easily be imple-
mented in standard BDI-based agent modelling frameworks,
such as AgentSpeak [35] or Jadex [31]. Since the basis of
our model is very similar to those models, this seems like a
promising direction.
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Appendix: Storylines and questionnaire
Story 1: Alan
Alan has a low level of empathy; he does not really care
about others. He has a strong desire to do something exiting.
He is also rather impulsive and aggressive. Moreover, he has
a desire for high gain; so he wants to do something with
high profits. Alan believes that stealing the groceries of an
old lady without violence might possibly fulfill his desire.
Further he believes that stealing a young man’s notebook
with violence will definitely fulfill his desire. Alan considers
stealing the groceries of an old lady a reasonable option.
Alan considers stealing the notebook of a young man a good
option. He intends to steal the notebook as soon as he gets
the opportunity. Alan believes that there is an opportunity to
steal an old lady’s groceries. He also believes that there is
an opportunity to steal a young man’s notebook. Alan steals
the notebook.
Story 2: Bob
Bob has a low level of empathy; he does not really care about
others. He has a desire to do something exiting, but if possi-
ble, he wants to do something that is safe. He is also rather
impulsive. He has a desire for high gain, but he has an even
higher desire for low loss. So, he wants to do something
with high profit, but thinks that low risks are even more im-
portant. Bob believes that stealing the groceries of an old
lady without violence will definitely fulfill his desire. Bob
believes that stealing a young man’s notebook with violence
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might possibly fulfill his desire. Bob considers stealing the
groceries of an old lady to be a good option. Bob considers
stealing the notebook of a young man to be a reasonable op-
tion. He intends to steal the groceries as soon as he gets the
opportunity. Bob believes that there is an opportunity to steal
a young man’s notebook and that there is an opportunity to
steal an old lady’s groceries. Bob steals the groceries.
Story 3: Charles
Charles has a desire to assault someone. He believes that
robbing the groceries from an old lady will fulfill his desire.
He also believes that stealing the notebook from a young
man will fulfill his desire. Charles has the intention to rob
an old lady. He also has the intention to steal a notebook.
Charles believes that there is an opportunity to steal a young
man’s notebook. He steals the notebook. He also believes
that there is an opportunity to steal an old lady’s groceries.
Charles steals the groceries.
Story 4: David
David has a low level of empathy; he does not really care
about others. He has a strong desire to do something exit-
ing. He is also rather impulsive and aggressive. Moreover,
he has a desire for high gain; so he wants to do something
with high profits. David believes that stealing the groceries
of an old lady without violence will definitely fulfill his de-
sire. Further he believes that stealing a young man’s note-
book with violence might possibly fulfill his desire. David
considers stealing the groceries of the old lady to be a good
option. David considers stealing the notebook of a young
man to be a reasonable option. He intends to steal the gro-
ceries as soon as he gets the opportunity. David believes that
there is an opportunity to steal an old lady’s groceries. He
also believes that there is an opportunity to steal a young
man’s notebook. David steals the groceries.
Story 5: Eric
Eric has a low level of empathy; he does not really care about
others. He has a desire to do something exiting, but if possi-
ble, he wants to do something that is safe. He is also rather
impulsive. He has a desire for high gain, but he has an even
higher desire for low loss. So, he wants to do something
with high profit, but thinks that low risks are even more im-
portant. Eric believes that stealing the groceries of an old
lady without violence will definitely fulfill his desire. Eric
believes that stealing a young man’s notebook with violence
might possibly fulfill his desire. Eric considers stealing the
groceries of an old lady to be a good option. He considers
stealing the notebook of a young man to be a reasonable op-
tion. He intends to steal the groceries as soon as he gets the
opportunity. Eric believes that there is an opportunity to steal
a young man’s notebook and that there is an opportunity to
steal an old lady’s groceries. Eric steals the notebook.
Questionnaire
Name:
Gender:
Age:
Occupation:
Please fill out the following questionnaire
(1 = totally disagree, 4 = neutral, 7 = totally agree)
I expected Alan to steal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
the notebook
Alan behaves like a real 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
person
I understand Alan’s 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
behaviour
Alan is an aggressive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
person
I liked reading this story 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
This is an interesting story 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
This is a realistic story 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I have sympathy for Alan 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Alan seems to be a nice guy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Alan thinks before he acts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Alan behaves rationally 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Alan reasons rationally 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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